Abstract
Despite his international popularity, the thought of Gustav Radbruch, especially in Italy, was often reduced until today to his famous formula. Thanks to recent translations it is now possible and dutiful to reconsider his entire philosophical-juridical system, to discover an always current thinker and to understand even his formula more deeply.
This paper aims to be a brief introduction to the fundaments of Gustav Radbruch’s philosophy of law. In particular, it analyses the theoretical basis which the author develops his theory from and the main issues of his reflection: the principle of methodical dualism and the principle of relativism. His juridical-philosophical thought, indeed, starts from the conception of separation between Reality and Value and the consequential irreducibility of the second term from the first. This implies that the value judgement can be justified only from other value judgement and the latest value can’t be demonstrated but only professed. So, it is impossible to decide scientifically among different value judgements. This concept entails relativism. Relativism’s conception leads to the rejection of a foundation of an absolute position but it doesn’t lead to the impossibility to take a stand. In fact, through the philosophy of law it’s possible to inquire deeply every position to make a conscious choice about our own weltanschauung.
The conclusion of this paper tries to give a brief illustration of the impact that Gustav Radbruch’s legal philosophy has had on the juridical-philosophical contemporary systems.
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