**Drawn Together.**  
*Graphics & Collective Intentionality*  

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**Abstract:** Our species has been termed “the crazy hominid” for its proclivity to spend resources constructing cultural worlds upon the natural. This treatment of drawing’s place in that begins from marks in a Paleolithic cave, recently considered Neandertal, thereby narrowing the species gap. This raises the questions of what the significance and the place such marks hold in the construction and use of aspects of cultural worlds. We approach the latter question free of terms such as “symbol”, “refer”, “stand for”, “likeness”, “convention”. In their place we take drawings to be basically artifacts, and, consulting the first of three original theorists, Michael Tomasello, argue that the very conception of artifacts involves five orders of intentionality and already a normative “we-intentionality” of social construction. Regarding our modern, industrial, physical world of artifacts, we argue that to be based on certain drawing practices: no drawing, no modern world. Lev Vygotsky’s idea of a “mediator” class of artifacts then provides conceptions for explaining how social constructions are thus based on the natural world, notably including our brains. Kendall Walton’s account of depiction in terms of imagining is applied by considering a Rembrandt drawing in the terms presented.

**Keywords:** Artifacts; Intentional affordances; Vygotskian mediators; Shared intentionality; Community

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**From the Caves to Communities**

The declared discovery in 2018 that Neandertals drew in the La Pasiega cave near Santander, Spain was a notable event, whose immediate interpretation has implications for drawing, culture, social reality and is said even to affect our understanding of ourselves¹. The markings were not discovered then, having been copied (see figure) by Henri Breuil a century before and subsequently interpreted by André Leroi-Gourhan and others. What was news was the advanced uranium-

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¹ See Hoffman *et al.* 2018, p. 914.
thorium (U-Th) dating of a few calcite deposits overlying them, which would put back their creation (with those of a hand stencil and a painted wall) back to at least twenty-thousand years before our *Homo sapiens* species is thought to have entered Europe, taking on our modern nature (largely as evidenced by similar material-cultural remains), thus implying that their creators were the Neandertals previously known to occupy those places. The significance of this discovery is that, as one of its archaeologists, João Zilhão, put it, there would no longer be “support for a cognitive gap between Neandertals and modern humans”, for “they are a variety of human kind”\(^2\), even: ”According to our new data Neanderthals and modern humans shared symbolic thinking and must have been cognitively indistinguishable”\(^3\). Of course some scientists were skeptical, and the press rather careless about this “bombshell”.

Ours is the philosophical “meta”-question, why some scant, unimpressive 1-cm line markings of a familiar Paleolithic type would be accorded so much meaning. The reply is in terms of “symbols”, that they are “a deliberate part of [Neandertal] symbolical, cultural repertoire”\(^4\), for “this cave painting activity constitutes a symbolic behavior by definition, and one that is deeply rooted.” Our job is to help understand what “symbolic” and like terms mean here and why they should be so closely associated with our species – its experience of culture and its social, besides physical, realities. Since we are considering social constructions in terms of drawings, we should begin with an account of the drawings. That might appear straightforward yet, perhaps surprisingly, this effort will carry us some distance into an account of the seemingly far more abstract social realities whose construction and maintenance drawing’s varieties not only affect but effect.

**Drawings as Artifacts**

I hope it will not seem pedantic to remark that the meter-plus high, red, ladder-like form on a column of La Pasiega (called “La Trampa”, the trap) – with the probably later-added faint animal contours framed by its “rungs” and a hovering swarm of dots – is more a drawing than a painting, like our species’ extremely impressive much later charcoal depictions in the same cave and elsewhere. Ev-

\(^2\) João Zilhão, in YouTube video, Kate Rogers, “Neanderthal Origin of Iberian Cave Art” (Department of Archaeology, University of Southampton, 2018), available also online in Kate Wong, “Ancient Cave Paintings Clinch the Case for Neandertal Symbolism”, *Scientific American* (23 Feb. 2018).

\(^3\) Quoted in Wong, “Ancient Cave Paintings”.

Everyday experience seem to show that the distinction between drawing and painting is soundly based. Painting we all know as a method of covering surfaces – more like the also alleged Neandertal painted wall and stencil hand-prints in La Pasiega – whereas drawing, well named with words like “disegno” and “le dessin”, “reserves” its ground and is associated with lines, which are typically 1D rather than 2D markings (or 0D dots), whatever their meanings for higher dimensions. Whereas we paint surfaces we only draw on them.

The result is that drawing, with the expense of little material and effort, is capable of many variations and thereby of carrying much information. A first, very significant, point for our work on social ontology is that this information is for humans, a notably visual kind of animal, whose (binocular) vision is particularly sensitive to edge and therefore contour detection. Also, drawings, since they do not cover their tracks, leave records of the physical actions by which they were made, and, if around a fifth of the human brain is entirely dedicated to vision, twice as much deals with visual plus motor, or plus spatial and like, processing. Much drawing takes advantage of this; indeed technical and machine drawing must take pains to block it, whereas other kinds depend on viewers imaginatively “finishing” their strokes. Much more might be said about this kind of “for” (for the evolved human visual system), but let us take the word more generally. That drawings are for human perceivers and users already implies purposes, final causes, due to the simple fact that drawings are artifacts: things made on purpose, for purposes of use – often multiple.

That immediately gets us closer to what may be meant by “symbolising”, which is apparently a kind of use. But first, to establish that all these cave markings, “dots, lines, disks, and hand stencils”, are artifacts, paleo-archeologists need to show that they were put there on purpose – including natural features that were left, to be understood in their terms. Thus the first (“on”) purpose, which seems secure in our example, consists of regular 1D marks (drawn with another artifact), two vertical (swaying in parallel), enclosing a few short, parallel horizontals, which abut them at T-junctions, thus a whole thing, termed “a red scalariform sign”, of parts. (Regarding facture, the <1m verticals look drawn downward, maybe by a practiced right-hander, the “rungs” added after.) ‘On purpose for purpose’: what of the second (“for”) purpose? Although we don’t know, we at least can guess that it was made to be seen by people, repeatedly (and has been!), for some purpose – maybe including just seeing it. Thus it seems reasonable at least to term it a “sign” (reserv-

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5 As the announcement of the finding relates, non-graphic “symbolic” effects, including painting, have long been attributed to Neandertals. Thus Hoffmann et al. 2018, p. 912: “The origin of human symbolism is a central concern of modern paleoanthropology. For the European Middle Paleolithic and the African Middle Stone Age, symbolic behavior has been inferred from the use, presumably for body adornment, of mineral pigments, shell beads, eagle talons, and feathers. Cave and rock art constitutes particularly impressive and important evidence for symbolic behavior”.

6 This is the main theme of Gombrich 1960.

ing “symbol”) whatever other functions it may have had. I suggest that these are already more significant findings for social ontology than might appear.

Artifact Perception

The great psychologist Lev Vygotsky, to whom we soon turn, liked to quote Wolfgang Köhler’s remark that the ape is “the slave of its own visual field”8. A century on, the primatology science Köhler helped found proves that, at least regarding chimpanzees, out of sight is not out of mind. Chimps assess and solve problems, make and use tools, leave a site to fetch unfamiliar tools that might be useful to achieve assessed goals, which they have kept in mind9. However I hold that such intelligence with artifacts does not show that apes perceive them as artifacts, whereas, crucially, humans do – which, I further argue, involves us in a) five orders of intentionality and thereby b) in a social reality, for which the key is “we”.

Re a): Beginning with orders of intentionality, the first three are because to perceive things as artifacts is to take them as being made on purpose for purpose, while the fourth and fifth are because we are guided in their use by the understanding that they were thus made. In this, artifact perception follows a five-order intentionality pattern of communication. For example, to understand others to be signalling us, we need 1) to notice the signal, also to take it as 2) made noticeable to us, and that in order for us not only to notice it, but also to take it as 3) done in such a manner that 4) we would assume that it 5) was done for that reason. If complicated to describe this is something that we take in, literally, as quick as a wink – a smile, nod, or slight gesture – including (according to Ian McKewan) the politician’s smirk that expresses, “I’m lying, you know I’m lying and I know that you know and I don’t give a damn.” More socially, the recommended eye-contact in traffic should signal a five-order “calypso” rhythm: “I see you and that you see me, and that you see that, too (and so we agree).”

Artifacts, which drawings are, are likewise understood through five orders. So, for example, if rioters block a road with obstacles, they impede traffic in a way significantly unlike the white lines on the road that constitute an official stop-sign. Unlike drawn lines, although obstacles may satisfy some of the conditions, these do not include 4) and 5), which are necessary for one to comply with a rule for its sake. To maintain community, this should be our main reason for stopping – a law, taken as applying to us all – if not our only reason, as physical safety looms large. Nor does this prevent authorities from also using barriers, such as gates and traffic bumps, as what Donald Norman terms “forcing functions”10. It is exactly when a

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8 Vygotsky 1956, p. 28.
10 See Norman 2013, Ch. Four.
sense of community is in doubt that coercion becomes the main reason for compliance. Thus lines of legality: but what of artifacts, including drawings, generally? That brings us to b), which arises from a normative background much broader than the legal, a social background of what Michael Tomasello terms “intentional affordances”. What are they? Physical affordances, we understand in terms of J.J. Gibson’s coinage, “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.” To this Tomasello adds that

the tools and artifacts of a culture have another dimension – ... the “ideal” dimension – that produce[s] another set of affordances for anyone with the appropriate kinds of ... skills. As human children observe other people using cultural tools and artifacts, they often engage in the process of imitative learning in which they attempt to place themselves in the “intentional space” of the user – discerning the user’s goals, what she is using the artifact “for”. ... [T]he child joins the other person in affirming what “we” use this object “for”. ... After she has engaged in such a process she comes to see some ... artifacts as having, in addition to their natural sensory-motor affordances, another set of what we might call intentional affordances based on her understanding of the intentional relations that other persons have with that object or artifact – that is, the intentional relations that other persons have to the world through the artifact.

He reminds us that children often ask what an artifact, or aspect of one, is by asking what it’s for – implying a second “for”: “for us”. The intentional affordances that characterize artifacts would therefore be understood in terms of what we (or they) use them for, where “we” denotes a social group, often beginning with one’s family, but broadening to others, with growing social “we”-awareness, even to a sense of objectivity. With this goes at least a mild sense of normal use as a norm. “Supposed to” is a familiar way of expressing this, and misuse, including

11 Close to our topic, critics of John Searle’s account of institutional facts have offered the following account of traffic signs (lights). According to these authors, Searle’s view is that such a sign works “only because we collectively regard it as having a certain status”, and it is “collective intentionality, which confers this status.” By contrast they hold that “the content of such facts can be fully analyzed in terms of actions and incentives”. On their account, “Laws and customs incentivize such actions by prescribing punishment to any action that does not accord with the laws and customs relating to traffic lights. It is our contention that this is the full story about traffic lights. … Once we are aware of the actions associated … and the incentives … there is no remaining need for talk about ‘irreducibly social objects’, ‘collective intentionality’, and the like.” Quoted from Smit, Buekens, Du Plessis 2011, pp. 5f – complying with journal customs regarding short quotations. This elimination of orders 4) and 5), I hold, would not only exclude communication but community, as what Tony Judt termed “institutions and relations of … cohesion, trust, custom, restraint, obligation, morality” (Judt 2007, p. 313).

12 Tomasello 1999 pp. 84f, italics mine. For “ideal” Tomasello cites Lightfoot, Cole and Cole 1996. In the next citation, for “ratchet” see Tomasello 1999, pp. 36-41.

13 To this must be added that, fortunately, this allows for the eccentric, for example makeshift, use that typifies our understanding of artifacts. Like an opposite, artifact agnosia, extreme so-called “functional fixedness” would be a psychological condition.

14 See Tomasello 2014, Ch. 4.

15 Of course, this is separate from deontic uses of some artifacts, such as the lane mark-
wrong use, regarding artifacts is not only widely recognized by, but also – even apart from the sacred – partly formative of, cultures, including sub-cultures. This is of great practical advantage in learning artifact use, thereby in doing things, especially where this is specialized, or when we live in a dense environment of them. Indeed (a point Tomasello stresses with his “ratchet effect”), it is crucial to our modern species’ progress, in being able to maintain useful changes in artifacts so as to improve on them, in turn, over time.  

Signs as Display Artifacts

According to this pair of hypotheses, it is not merely the fashioning or using of artifacts that has enabled our modern technical progress, but, in addition, our ability to recognize them as artifacts. When this began in our evolution we do not know, but the natural/artificial – indeed, happened/done – (allowing for mixtures) became a basic categorial division, strongly shaping our experiences and activities. This produces hazards, for one, our well-known proclivity to over-attribute purposes. And at present, of course, our growing tendency to shape nature into artifacts with our intentional affordances is of great concern.

Let us now narrow our study of drawings as artifacts to a certain kind, “signs”. Returning to the cave, the excitement among archaeologists about redating “La Trampa” is due to assuming that it is a graphic artifact that forms a “sign”, even without knowing what it was for. What is the significance of this? I begin by suggesting that such signs are, first of all, displays, that is, artifacts with prominently display functions, by which we mean that their purposes are largely to be noticed, but also noticed as having been made and presented in order to be noticed. That goes back to our signalling cases – for example the distinction between “waving and drowning”. We make many decisions about such matters. We may thank Sperber and Wilson for this example: is the empty glass only salient, or was it also made evident, as a sign that the drinker would like the server to notice that and therefore ask whether the drinker would like it refilled? Dropped handkerchiefs etc. provide other examples; indeed lovers through the ages tend to over-interpret similar sign matters, rather like divine ones.

For by far the most part, drawings are display artifacts in this sense, even where, as often, the only perceivers intended drew them. That is because these artifacts work by being perceived, usually seen, and taken to be made and lo-

16 This is consistent with our important, constant dependence on ad hoc, including makeshift, private artifact use. For example, a slight mark drawn to show where to cut need not – no more than a folded paper-napkin (matchbooks being out of style) leveling a table – meet a social standard. “Measure twice, cut once”, goes the adage. But if you mark when you measure, painful experience identifying the right one shows the intentionality condition to be robust.

icated partly with that purpose. This we considered earlier when thinking about what, as artifacts, “La Trampa”’s marks were for, and thus shaped to a certain kind of vision. Thus, in taking it to be a sign, we assume that its red pigment was deliberately laid down in lines at least partly in order to be seen – a plausible hypothesis. Uncertainty arises, we noted, as to what the purpose of its being seen might have been: for whom it was for something. Fortunately, the sign is of a familiar sort, there being many more, from later epochs, in the caves of Cantabria and elsewhere, providing researchers context with which to work. We look forward to seeing what they find.

With that note let us return to the question of what, besides being a display, would make “La Trampa” a “sign”, and how as such it might have related to long-ago social realities.

Vygotsky’s Sign “Mediators”

We already have been considering an intentionality-order pattern that characterizes our perception of artifacts and a normative element, both of which involve a sense of community, of a “we”. We have applied these to drawings, but so far only as entities taken as artifacts, intensifying the collective sense by further classifying them as displays. But in hailing the interpretation of alleged Neandertal drawings as display signs, something more is surely meant. After all, it was already accepted that Neanderthals painted walls, stones, bones, parts of their bodies with colorants for “symbolic” reasons, possibly including fully socially-constructive meanings, such as adornment, marking social rank or what is ambiguously and vaguely referred to as “ritual” purposes. What else is attributed is a kind of display “that is symbolic, that represents something.” But, beyond the just listed, what could that mean? Most often this is “explained” in terms of “referring to”, “pointing to”, “putting one in mind of” or “standing for” something “beyond itself”. But such phrases, besides their unclarity, seem inappropriate, since many drawn signs, such as our road markings, would “refer” to or “stand for” only themselves, if anything.

Let us therefore avoid all such conceptions by asking, in our present terms, what these kinds of display artifacts, drawings, are for, for us. This is a question about what we are intended to do with them. Great emphasis on the uses of signs is not only a well-known strategy in philosophy, the image historian Gombrich also advised that we should always look to “the function of the image”. This approach helps us notice

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18 The “at least partly” allows also, for example, for the drawing actions noted above to have been an important motive, if only with a sort of “Kilroy” intention.
19 For illustrations, see Clottes 2008.
20 See Jones 2018. Also we are reminded that in Africa there are 100ka-old drawn stone inscriptions, notably the incised patterns found in the Blombos cave in South Africa, perhaps due by Homo erectus.
21 Alistair Pike, from YouTube video, Kate Rogers, “Neanderthal Origin of Iberian Cave Art”.
that characteristic of the standard ways of thinking just listed is focus on dyadic
relationships, of the sign and its “subject,” sometimes called “the (real) world”, leaving
us out, rather than in terms of our active uses of such artifacts – what they are for, for
us (or them). Otherwise, all such “x>y” approaches invite the question, “so what?”
Let us therefore ask what are our main functions for such displays.

A simple, straightforward way of answering was provided by Lev Vygotsky,
who, conveniently here, used “sign” in terms of “artifacts”, among which he distin-
guished them from “tools”. Tools he called “externally oriented” artifacts, which
we use to affect our environments, while signs are “internally oriented” artifacts,
which we make and place in environments to work back upon our minds, via our
active perceptions of them. Signs he termed “mediators”. For Vygotsky, a mediator
“has the reverse action” to a tool. It “operates on the individual, not the environ-
ment,” so that by its use people become “both the subjects and objects of their
own behavior,” thereby gaining a measure of freedom from biological exigencies.
For simple example, ancient “use of notched sticks and knots” for reminders show
that humans early “went beyond the limits of the functions given them by nature
for a new culturally-elaborated organization of their behavior.”

Of particular interest in such procedures is the issue of freedom, that thereby we
actively “use our brains”, by singling out and exploiting some of its evolved capaci-
ties for our own purposes – such as, in Vygotsky’s mnemonic example, off-loading
short-term memory tasks to our visual recognition systems – or, by counting on
digits, our other senses. This is possible due to degrees of modularity of our senses
and other cognitive systems, and their adaptability to “detached” or borrowed
uses. The basic idea is simple. Since we naturally use different parts of our brains
(for example those related to different senses) to assist other parts in their projects,
humans elaborate ways of making these connections via aspects of their physical
environments that will engage, stimulate and guide the recruited systems.

Thereby we have invented what are termed “cognitive artifacts”, as ways of
calling select mental systems to the assistance of others, via loops through the en-
vironment. Before considering depictions as mediators, let us note how important
drawing examples are provided by visual marking systems used for doing complex
calculations, musical notation – and writing itself. All these require drawing in
just the ways considered above. Not only is writing (including with brush) a kind
of drawing, so is mechanical printing, for printing is done in fonts, each of which
must be drawn in design and physical formation. Therefore, regarding construc-
tions of social realities, for which thinkers such as John Searle take language to
be essential, absent drawing there would be no extra-somatic way to sustain and
develop them – no Tomasello “ratchet effect” – only oral traditions and close imi-
tation, which we know well from some cultural forms, notably conservative ones.
There, to be sure, change may occur, by a sort of “grandmother’s footsteps” mutation method. With display mark-making comes power to “put things on paper”

22 Vygotsky 1934, p. 55.
23 See Goody and Watt 1963, pp. 304-345. Goody coined the term “structural amnesia”.
and other surfaces, as a way of developing, preserving – thereby sharing – information and ideas about it. Thus drawing systems became technologies, amplifiers for our abilities to do such social things\textsuperscript{24}. Of course, every amplifier being a filter, there are problems with this – indeed gratifying is the extent to which recent technologies have restored oral traditions (and also graphics). But since that interesting topic would carry us off, let us return again to La Pasiega, to consider some possible “sign” functions of our image, on Vygotsky’s way of thinking.

One might be decorative, a very important function: to mark out for viewers the physical entity it is on – e.g. to stress its verticality, with divisibility into bands. This would be no small matter. Our conceptions of things are greatly shaped in terms of what is made perceptually salient (displayed) about them, and in drawing and painting that may be “located” on them (even apart from Ice Age “fertility” suggestions!), or placed, perhaps by transfer, on other surfaces, for us to see. Another might be to plan a ladder (or trap!), or more abstractly, a way of making enclosures (the “frames” later people used it for), perhaps to help categorize things. More abstractly, it might provide a motor-visual manner of experiencing space as continuous (analog) in directions, yet divisible into discrete parts (digital). In all such cases, Vygotsky’s “mediation” suggests that our visual-motor systems’ abilities to grasp all at once such a visual field, to distinguish figure and ground, (as mentioned) its extreme sensitivity to edges and junctions, and so forth are recruited as devices to help us remember, think about or experience such matters, visual or not\textsuperscript{25}.

The modern world is characterized by masses of artifacts, entities made on purpose for purposes. Indeed, as an industrial (and post-) world, it may be defined by these being, overwhelmingly, industrially designed, produced, distributed and used. Drawing made this possible, and it has been said that the line between the industrial and traditional worlds past and present is drawn by a draughtsman’s pen\textsuperscript{26}. Among the many obvious advantages of this is that components manufactured in different, including remote, places fit when assembled. Such design drawing, like “La Trampa”, is largely a matter of shaped 1D marks on open 2D grounds, physically fixed extra-somatically in 3D space, for multiple attentions, diachronically (not “written on water”; its 4th D) – and perhaps synchronically among some “us”. Therefore, although modern social realities rest on physical realities, the great prominence for us, within the latter, of artifacts with intentional affordances, makes an important sector of physical reality dependent on social realities enabled by kinds of drawing.

\textsuperscript{24} For technologies and the amplifier/suppressor duo, see Maynard 1997, pp. 75-87.

\textsuperscript{25} For the moment we set aside possible metaphysical, shamanistic uses such as those argued by Lewis-Williams (2002), to which we will briefly return. An excellent example of such functional reasoning is Clottes and Courtin 1996, Chs 9 and 10.

\textsuperscript{26} See Maynard 2010, Ch.1 and Pacey 1974. This includes computer drawing, since not only are computers design objects but microcircuits must be drawn.
Depictive Drawing and Reality Making

By now, it will have been noticed that we have left depiction out of the picture: odd because major historical examples of constructions of social realities clearly rest on it. For example, much modern depiction, notably by non-graphic methods such as photography, are late developments of depictive practices and habits developed in the West. Thereby, with “visual aids” and other sense mediators, massive social constructions of the existence of unperceived entities and events have been transmitted to and maintained among billions, sustaining self-termed “communities” of the living and not, across millennia and around the world. These successful technologies of “sign” production clearly work by taking our sensory powers “beyond the limits of the functions given them by nature for a new culturally-elaborated organization of ... behavior” (Vygotsky 1956). Such physical mediators form the basis of what we now consider visual art.

Rather than go further with historical cases – including the struggles within, then among, such communities, let us consider depiction in terms of our account of “signs” as display artifacts. Fortunately, we can again call on an original theorist, on just one part of an original, carefully elaborated theory: Kendall Walton, on “representation”, a subkind of which, (visual) depiction, comprehends most of the visual art just mentioned and a great deal more27. On this account, mediators work not only by the vivid visual impressions they make but by two other factors. The first is of course the entities and events they have us imagine, and also imagine seeing, since that is what such artifacts are basically for, for us in modern communities: visual imagining. We are easily able to imagine on our own, quite vividly, seeing things, actual or not, but visual depiction enhances – indeed forces – our powers to do so in extended ways, often also as shared among an “us”.

The second factor is an ingenious, second Vygotskian turning of an aspect of our nature into a mediator for an effect on ourselves (“using our brains”). Since in order to access such depictions for our imagining project of seeing images, as just described, we need to look at them, depiction involves us in an attendant act of imagining – about ourselves: that is, about our acts of looking. In a sort of meta-seeing we imagine that to be the seeing we are imagining, which “immersion” greatly enhances the latter. Thus whether the La Pasiega stenciled hand-print depicted a hand depends on whether it was put there to invoke imagining seeing of a hand in that way. This is not obvious, since, for example, we do not use seeing footprints, tracks, of animals (including ours) for imagining seeing the soles of their feet, even their feet – or wheel tracks as wheels.

This immediately distinguishes visual depiction from the most visually vivid writing, where we do not imagine our visual act of reading to be seeing what we are imagining. Coleridge’s favorite line in Shakespeare, “Light thickens, and the

Walton 1990.
crow/ Makes wing to th’ rooky wood” (*MacBeth* ll.51f) might have us imagine seeing (sensing) vividly, but not thus about our looking at the line in the text.\(^{28}\)

"A Man-Made Dream for Waking Eyes"\(^{29}\)

Fortunately, Walton’s theory of representation neither begins with nor is focused upon visual depictions, which constitute only one sort of “prop” for imagining, since such imagining seeing serves as entry (as famously resisted by some modernists), to much wider imagining projects, many of which greatly elaborate our shared social realities. It seems pertinent that, returning to Ice Age cave “artists”, the leading hypothesis for their great efforts over many millennia at placing elaborated images deep in stone recesses, remote from habitation and lit only by fires, is shamanistic: as a way of participating in an imagined, “spiritual” reality at those points of contact, a reality – to go by present shamanism – otherwise found in dreams, hallucinations and induced trance-vision.\(^{30}\) Such are “fictional worlds”, sometimes of great scope. Movies and tv (industries for producing mediators for imagining) prove again how interested people are in exploring them, even when very unpleasant. Walton notes that fictional worlds intersect the real one, since we often imagine about the real – for example, as just noted, about ourselves and our actions – also truly. Fact and fiction are different, not incompatible. Furthermore, our species is often thought unique in its habitually shaping the world according to the imagined. Contrary to common notions of “imitating” bits of “reality”, many drawings are necessary for bringing them into existence. As indicated above, Western religious traditions of forming conceptions and attitudes, as well as strong feelings, have greatly affected the habits and appetites of the entire modern, secular world. This is owing to the employment in commercial marketing with Vygotskian mediators, as psychology, now aided by neuroscience, discovers more about how mental, even brain, processes are related. Thereby the activities of some can be directed by “assisting” them through links to the activities of the others – notably of the visual together with the limbic – in effect as Plato and historical iconoclasts had warned.

For drawing’s role in the construction of social realities in the direction of constructing and maintaining *institutional* rather than physical entities, we would need to focus on different cases. We have already encountered important examples of drawn lines such as road markings, among many boundaries, notably those drawn

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\(^{28}\) As expected, art complicates. Of course poetry exploits its sounds and thereby our hearing of them. Shakespeare’s use of “makes” rather than “takes” adds to the sense of weight, and do I just imagine that the “m” also suggests its low wings? Walton deals with e.g. epistolary novels and of course oral narrative (see Kendall 1990, ch. 9).

\(^{29}\) A nice, but loose translation by Francis Cornford of Plato, *Sophist* 266c: οἷον ὄναρ ἄνθρωπον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην – which does not mention eyes.

\(^{30}\) This is the view argued by Lewis-Williams (1998) and Clottes (2016). Lewis-Williams’ research began with stone markings and shamanistic practices of southern Africa, still extant.
on maps and documents about which much could be said. However, to quote: “Freunde, nicht diesen Tone! Sondern last uns angenehmere anstimmen, und freudenvoller.” Especially as this paper is completed in the time of Covid-19, it must not end on advertising or any like note but, having so far discussed “drawn”, on its other title word: “together” – more “pleasantly and joyfully”.

**Drawing Together**

To be fair, the human “together” has been a main theme throughout, in terms of “we-consciousness” at various levels, as may be seen by brief review. It began with an account of drawings as artifacts and thereby, it was argued, in five orders of intentionality, connecting people, an idea reinforced by a treatment of “display”, which, as a kind of communication, stresses the five-order pattern. That account was made even more social with Michael Tomasello’s “intentional affordances” as involved in understanding something as an artifact, which made explicit the community ideas of “for us”, in radiating senses of the “us” involved, and thereby a *normative* aspect relating people. Indeed it becomes a meaningful question whether this cooperative spirit, which entails several orders of intentionality, may be found in any other “social” creatures (Tomasello doubts it, even regarding other apes31).

Yet besides the need for more togetherness in the account, a glaring deficiency was that the case for drawing had been made only in the general terms of display artifacts. Something additional, we noted, was required of such “signs” to make them “representational” in the most interesting sense for human cultures. So we turned to different kinds of drawing, notably with depictive functions – a frequent touchstone (and *trampa*!) in thinking about such matters. Visual depictions provide excellent illustrations of how Vygotskian mediators work to create (in Tomasello’s terms) cooperative, beyond collaborative, relationships among people to form societies, which are our greatest “social constructions”. These mediators, we recall, are artifacts whose use is, through the perceiving of them, to mobilize groups of our faculties for common activities – such as vivid, complex, extended imagining projects. Wonderful is it that, displayed as they are – perceptually accessible in common, even public, spaces – other people can “hack” such cognitive loops: all the more readily as that their functions include that, and also that it is from others designers that they learned the practices. That is why, having no idea to what extent those things held for “La Trampa”, the stencil or painted wall – what they were for and for whom – we do do not know how to use them. Hence there seems little to say about them as signs.

31 See Tomasello 2014, Ch. 3.
We need a richer example of a drawing made to induce imagining, in order to close with something brief but significant regarding at least one kind of its drawing’s 'we'-intentionality and social reality. Let us use a depictive work of art – one concerning our very topic – basic and meaningful: Rembrandt’s great drawing of an infant being helped learn to walk. There the artist provides a veritable review of intentionalities, as an infant holds the attentions of four people but the shared attention of only three. The attentions include that of a woman in a pinafore, with a full pail, approaching stairs while, seemingly, registering the intentional states of the others, as the child attempts to walk with the assistance of two carers and encouragement of another. Those three, beyond having intentions, may be said to have the “shared intention” of helping the child take first steps, towards a goal. The child is thereby enclosed in their cooperative actions – likely involving three generations – adjusted to one-another’s, in a six-order intentionality pattern, where each supporter is aware that the other knows that she assists the other (by foot

32 Rembrandt, “A Child Being Taught to Walk”, pen and brown ink (ca 1656), British Museum, likely not for presentation. We may look at the wonderful aging head right and wonder at the label, “two girls, seen from behind, supporting the child on either side ”, or David Hockney’s, “held by her mother and older sister”. If it is an observational record of the artist’s family, its date would be a year or so earlier, since his third “Cornelia” (named after his mother) was born in 1654, neither of the previous two having survived a month.
placement, “grandmother” seems to take the lead), in helping the child totter toward the seated figure who, meeting the child’s gaze, encourages the child to approach – a pattern taken in at a glance by the bucket bearer, making seven intentionality orders (besides ours)33.

Yet although such an impressive number of orders may be distinctive of our species, it is not the most human part depicted. That is the sharing of intentions. By a few strokes, Rembrandt has us imagine ourselves taking in at a glance, then appreciating more, a situation that philosophers find remarkably hard to describe34: a variety of individual selves experiencing being part of a shared action, of doing something “together”. Such experience is necessary to the group activities they animate. We all know this to be one of the most important things in a human life, though also that it admits of degrees35. Crucial to human society, as opposed to animal flocks and other aggregates, is also that a sense of joint endeavor and experience pervades parts and aspects of it.

Now, let us consider the drawing itself, that set of marks on a ground – Rembrandt’s shared mediator – as to how it might sustain “we”-ontology. We surely understand it above all as a visual display artifact (not as a group of people), made on purpose for, initially, imagining seeing in the ways just described, which understanding guides our actions with it. Although the artist likely drew it for just himself, the technique of display is for an “us” (we know his market). Accordingly, it works by an uneven variety of gestured lines (this is Rembrandt!) mainly indicating enclosures that depict figures on a ground, in a space of lit air, the fall of light indicated by other kinds of strokes, or modulations of contours. Things are rendered in volumetric (relief), and enclosing spaces by contours or occlusions signified by marks constituting the standard T, L, Y and arrow junctions of human perception. Thus the likely added bucket-lady’s shapes are kept apart by avoiding junctions of its lines with any of the others – whose lines, by contrast, Rembrandt runs through the others’ forms, emphasizing their jointness. We may note that he avoids indicating faces, whose visual cues are among the easiest and most used in the artist’s toolbox. Yet, not in full face, there are the slight, lighter strokes for the child’s cheek and eye, with the breathtaking and moving darker ones that indicate the “grandmother”’s pursed-lipped profile and head, with perhaps a wisp of hair, above her measured shuffle.

Time and space drop away as Rembrandt thereby evokes, for unnumbered viewers in many lands, for over 360 years so far, these experiences of seeing, and also

33 This, I argue, disproves the influential view of Robin Dunbar, for the Social Brain Hypothesis, that five orders is about all we can manage: see, e.g., Dunbar 2004, pp. 120f. Dennett and Stringer for example, accept this.
34 For a critical review, albeit via a narrower topic, see Gilbert 2008, pp. 483-514.
35 The study of autism focuses on an extreme of this. A poignant example is cited by Peter Hobson, of “a young, intelligent, autistic adult” who testified about his childhood: “I really didn’t know there were people until I was seven years old. … I still have to remind myself that there are people. … I never could have a friend. I really don’t know what to do with other people, really.” Hobson 2002, p. 11.
much more, including empathetic ones from our motor and proprioceptive senses and experiences (including, with the bucket-bearer, too, our backs!), for us to use in the perceptual acts it invites. It is for us, for that purpose, which is why it is preserved in a museum, a “cultural” institution, which further helps sustain our broad sense of human community by doing the same for works of many other times and places. Rembrandt’s drawing thereby helps us “draw together” for a time, within ourselves, inchoate memories and abilities, now as a satisfying whole with a sense of openness, and thereby even a “community” within ourselves as persons. For art, no human experience is valueless. Last, a feature that makes such drawings greatly valued is that in thus cooperatively, even empathetically, following the traces of artists’ actions – using like aspects of ourselves – our minds meet with theirs.

References